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The Supreme Court has never declared unconstitutional a
treaty that has been ratified by the Senate.' However, a recent
treaty may push the Court's general reluctance to interfere with
international politics to the limit. Few treaties have contained as
many potential constitutional pitfalls as the Chemical Weapons
Convention ("CWC" or "Convention), 2 which attempts to control
the production of and ultimately to eradicate chemical weapons.
The CWC requires that all signatory states, "State Parties,"
submit to complex and highly intrusive procedures to verify their
compliance with the treaty. These procedures include on-site in-
spections of public and private facilities conducted by an interna-
tional verification team. Because chemical weapons are manufac-
tured in both public and private facilities, many inspections in
the United States will occur in privately owned facilities-raising
Fourth Amendment concerns. The Fourth Amendment protects
such private facilities from unreasonable government searches.'
Although the CWC attempts to address constitutional concerns of
State Parties,4 it does not possess a warrant requirement. The
absence of a warrant requirement is problematic because, under
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, warrantless searches are pre-
t BAL 1996, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1999, The University of Chicago.
' Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 137 (Norton 1972). However, at
least one lower court has held portions of a treaty to be unconstitutional. See id at 383
n 34.
' Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Senate Treaty Doc 103-21, 103d Cong, 1st
Sess 278 (1993). The treaty was ratified on April 24, 1997. Resolution of Ratification for
the Chemical Weapons Convention ("Ratification Resolution'), 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in
143 Cong Rec S 3651 (Apr 24, 1997).
' The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." US Const, Amend IV.
' The CWC requires that access for inspection remain subject to "any constitutional
obligations ... with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures." CWC, Annex
on Implementation and Verification ("Verification Annex"), Part X, 1 41, S Treaty Doc
103-21 at 435.
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sumptively unreasonable and therefore presumptively unconsti-
tutional.5
Significant interests are at stake in this debate. On the one
hand is the desire to eliminate all chemical weapons, which are
particularly frightening because of their use in terrorist attacks
and genocide,7 as well as in conventional warfare. For inspections
to be effective,' governments must be prevented from impeding
the work of verification inspectors. This is especially true as veri-
fication schemes are increasingly being relied upon as the means
to enforce international treaties.9 Furthermore, it is important for
the United States to abide by its international commitments; if
the United States breaches the CWC, other countries are likely to
follow suit. On the other hand, international law, and the Ameri-
can implementation thereof, must respect an individual's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is
particularly important in the context of the CWC because of the
possibility that members of an inspection teams may disclose or
steal confidential business information. 10
In light of these constitutional concerns, the Senate imposed
a number of conditions when it ratified the CWC; one condition
was a requirement that warrants be obtained for all non-
consensual inspections." However, the Senate may not be em-
powered to condition the treaty responsibilities of the United
States in this fashion. Some commentators have suggested that
' See Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 528-29 (1967) (noting that a "search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by
a valid search warrant").
" Consider, for example, the 1995 attack on a Tokyo subway train by the Aum Shinri-
kyo. This risk is increased by the massive availability of Russian chemical weapons sup-
plied to Russian organized crime. See Jo Durden-Smith, Russian Mafia Moves West, Mos-
cow Times (Mar 25, 1997) (noting the connection between Aum Shinrikyo and Russian
chemical weapons experts).
' Recall the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government on its Kurdish minority
population. See Lara Marlowe, Kurds Believe Only the U.S. Can Save Them, San Fran
Chron A12 (June 18, 1991) (alleging that "[tihe Iraqis used chemical weapons to depopu-
late" Kurdish regions).
" Effectiveness of the verification procedures will depend on the global perception that
states cannot mask noncompliance with CWC obligations.
' For example, efforts continue to negotiate amendments to the Biological Weapons
Convention to include a verification regime similar to the CWCs. See Barry Kelman, Bri-
dling the International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 Am U L Rev 755, 817-19
(1994).
"0 Aware of the potential for theft of confidential business information, the CWC in-
cludes an annex that sets out broad measures to deter theft. See CWC, Annex on the Pro-
tection of Confidential Information ("Confidentiality Index"), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 445.
" However, regular on-site inspections must meet the standard for administrative
searches, while challenge inspections are required to meet the more rigorous criminal
standard. Ratification Resolution § 2(28Xa)(i)-(ii), 143 Cong Rec at S 3657.
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such warrantless inspections are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment exceptions for administrative searches of closely
regulated industries" and national security interests." Others
have considered whether courts should decline to decide these
questions because the issues raised are political questions of for-
eign relations, expressly delegated to the executive branch.'4 No
solution, however, has yet been proposed that protects both the
need to verify compliance with the CWC and the need to ensure
civil liberties.
This Comment concludes that an expanded national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement
provides the optimal solution to the constitutional problems in-
herent in CWC inspections. Part I analyzes the CWC, focusing on
the structure of the verification procedures. Part HE considers the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and analyzes the poten-
tial effects of the CWC in action. Part I considers four potential
solutions to the problem, including expanding the national secu-
rity exception. Part IV analyzes the potential ramifications of ex-
panding the national security exception to include the verification
of disarmament procedures.
I. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The negotiations that produced the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention began in 1970 and were concluded in Paris on January
13, 1993 with the signatures of sixty-five member states. 5 The
' See David G. Gray, Note, "Then the Dogs Died": The Fourth Amendment and Verifi-
cation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 Colum L Rev 567, 644-50 (1994) (advocat-
ing a modified version of the closely regulated industry exception).
" See Debbie Ryan Bing-Zaremba, Comment, Knock, Knock, Who's There?.: Can
Chemical Weapons Inspectors Enter U.S. Facilities Without a Search Warrant?, 11 Temple
Intl & Comp L J 57, 75 (1997) (arguing that "the government's strong interest in protect-
ing its national security" would suffice in countering Fourth Amendment challenges). See
also Thomas A. Connolly, Note, Warrantless On-Site Inspections for Arms Control Verifica-
tion: Are They Constitutional?, 24 Stan J Intl L 179, 222 (1987) (arguing that "isolated
Presidential authorizations to inspect," in the exercise of national security power, may be
permissible).
" See Edward A. Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control In-
spections in the United States, 13 Yale J Intl L 21, 41 (1988) (arguing that "a violation of
private rights," as distinguished from a "dispute between coequal branches of govern-
ment," might be justiciable). See also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Constitution and On-Site In-
spection, 14 Brooklyn J Intl L 1, 3 (1988) (noting concern that permitting foreign delega-
tions to conduct searches may constitute an unconstitutional delegation of governmental
authority).
" See Patrick McDowell, Countries Sign Historic Treaty Banning Chemical Weapons,
AP (Jan 13, 1993). Through February 1998, 168 nations had signed the CWC and 106 of
these countries had ratified it. See Ray Moseley, Agency Oversees End of Chemical Weap-
ons Era in Many Nations, Chi Trib 13 (Feb 10, 1998).
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CWC was intended to extend the principles and objectives of the
Geneva Protocol of 192516 and the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction. 7 The
CWC's express purpose is "to exclude completely the possibility of
the use of chemical weapons"" through the destruction of all
stocks of chemical weapons and through the implementation of a
verification scheme designed to ensure that new weapons are not
produced.
Each State Party, upon ratifying the CWC, assumes five re-
sponsibilities. First, the State Party must declare the existence of
all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities
and then destroy them. 9 Second, the State Party must cease fu-
ture production and stockpiling of chemical weapons."0 Third, the
State Party must provide a general plan for the destruction of
chemical weapons,2 ' declare its annual progress on the implemen-
tation of the destruction process,22 and declare and provide infor-
mation about the facilities that currently produce restricted
chemicals for non-prohibited uses.2' Fourth, the State Party must
agree to allow its declarations to be verified by inspection.' The
verification regime has two main components: regular, on-site in-
spections of declared facilities, and challenge inspections, which
allow a State Party to request the inspection of any facility of an-
other State Party.' Fifth, each State Party must pass domestic
legislation implementing the CWC.26 To implement the CWC,
each State Party must create a National Authority to assist in
verification measures27 and must make criminal all activities
prohibited by the CWCY8
In order to ensure compliance with its terms, the CWC
authorizes the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of
" Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 26 UST 571, TIAS No 8061 (1925).
' 26 UST 583, TIAS No 8062 (1972).
CWC, Preamble, S Treaty Doe 103-21 at 279.
19 Id at Art I, 2-4, S Treaty Doe 103-21 at 281.
Id at Art I, I 1(a), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 281.
Id at Verification Annex, Part IV (A), 6, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 363.
"Id at Art IV, I 7(b), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 290 (governing annual progress reports).
Id at Art III, 1(c), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 287-88.
Id at Art IV, 1 5 (relating to weapons), S Treaty Doc 103-21; id at Art V, I 7(b), S
Treaty Doc 103-21 at 292 (relating to facilities). See also id at Verification Annex, S Treaty
103-21 at 332-444 (detailing verification procedures).
"Id at Art IX, 1 8-25, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 311-13 (discussing challenge inspec-
tions).
Id at Art VII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 297-98.
Id at Art VII, 914, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 297-98.
Id at Art VII, I 1(a), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 297-98.
[65:943
1998] Facilities Inspections
Chemical Weapons ("OPCW). 29 The OPCW is composed of three
distinct bodies: the Conference of States Parties (the "Confer-
ence"), the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.' °
The Conference, composed of one representative from each
State Party, maintains primary authority over the OPCW.5 ' The
Executive Council is a group of forty-one members elected by the
Conference for the purpose of facilitating the effective discharge
of CWC responsibilities.32 The Technical Secretariat is the en-
forcement arm of the OPCW, responsible for managing its day-to-
day operations. I
A. The Verification Process
The CWC verification system has three major elements:
mandatory information declarations, periodic on-site inspections
of declared facilities, and challenge inspections.' The verification
process is designed to control the creation of chemical weapons by
limiting the synthesis of toxic chemicals 5 and by regulating the
Id at Art VIII, 1 1, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 299.
Id at Art VIII, 4, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 299.
"Id at Art VIII, 19, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 301 ("The Conference shall be the prin-
cipal organ of the organization."); id at Art VIII, 9, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 300 ("Each
member shall have one representative in the conference."). The Conference determines the
scope of authority of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, votes upon mat-
ters brought to its attention by the Executive Council, and takes "the necessary measures
to ensure compliance with [the CWC]." Id at Art VIII, I 21(k), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 302.
For responsibilities of the Conference, see id at Art VIII, 91 19-22, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at
301-02.
' The delegates are nominated with emphasis on "the importance of chemical indus-
try," "political and security interests," and "equitable geographic distribution." Id at Art
VIII, 23, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 303. The Executive Council is an oversight group that
supervises the Technical Secretariat. It has the power to stop frivolous challenge inspec-
tions. In addition, it must approve all agreements (including facility agreements) relating
to verification of the CWC. Id at Art VIII, It 31, 34, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 304-05; id at
Art IX, 17, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 312 (relating to challenge inspections). Facility
agreements are general agreements as to the scope and nature of an allowable inspection.
Id at Art VIII, 1 37-38, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 306. It performs verification inspec-
tions and data analysis. The Secretariat is composed of as many inspectors and other pro-
fessionals as are necessary to effectively implement the CWC. Id. The Director General of
the Technical Secretariat will hire employees of the Secretariat according to need. Id at
Art VIII, 43-44, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 307. Inspectors are chosen from a list submit-
ted by each State Party and tend to be highly skilled professionals. See Moseley, Agency
Oversees, Chi Trib at 13 (cited in note 15).
" The verification process is detailed in the Verification Annex of the CWC. The An-
nexes of the CWC are subject to amendment or to reservations, which adhere to the ob-
jects and purposes of the Convention. See CWC, Art XV, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 320-21
(permitting amendments); id at Art XXII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 323 (proscribing reser-
vations to the Annexes that are "incompatible with [the Convention's] object and pur-
pose").
' Toxic chemicals are defined as "[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
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production of "precursors," which are the components necessary
to synthesize toxic chemicals.36 Chemicals are classified according
to their risk and are divided into four categories: Schedule 1,
Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and Other."
The foundation of the verification regime is mandatory in-
formation disclosure. Each State Party is required to list all ac-
tive facilities that produce regulated chemicals, to report the
amounts of these chemicals produced, and, in some instances, to
allow continuous monitoring of production by on-site data collec-
tion instruments." Based on the declared data, the Technical
Secretariat performs verification inspections. In addition, data
declaration serves as a baseline against which information dis-
covered during a challenge inspection is measured; any unregu-
lated, undeclared production of toxic chemicals discovered by a
challenge inspection is evidence of noncompliance with the CWC.
Based on the data declared by State Parties, the Technical
Secretariat performs regular on-site inspections to verify that de-
clared facilities are producing declared chemicals at declared lev-
els. Each declared facility is subject to an initial on-site inspec-
tion to verify the initial data,39 as well as subsequent inspections,
the style and frequency of which are to be determined by the
Schedule and amount of chemicals produced.
Schedule 1 on-site inspections will be conducted at least once
a year,40 subject to the terms of the facility agreement made be-
tween the facility owner and the Executive Council.41 The regular
animals." Id at Art II, 2, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 282.
Id at Art II, 3, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 282.
Id at Annex on Chemicals, Part A, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 326-27. Schedule 1
chemicals are the most toxic or dangerous; they have few uses other than as chemical
weapons and have previously been used as a chemical weapon. Schedule 1 chemicals may
only be produced at one facility per state, at a quantity of 1 tonne per year, and are subject
to continuous monitoring by the Technical Secretariat. Schedule 2 chemicals are danger-
ous chemicals or precursors that are not generally mass-produced. Schedule 2 chemicals
are subject to production limitations that vary by the individual chemical. Schedule 3
chemicals are toxic chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons or precursors to
chemical weapons, but which are extensively produced for non-prohibited activities as
well. "Other" chemicals include all organic chemicals, except petroleum products and other
combustibles that have a certain chemical composition. See id at Verification Annex, Part
IX, 1,S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 423.
Id at Art VI, 91 2-8, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 295-96. The CWC requires an initial
declaration, which will be verified by inspections, followed by annual declarations, which
are subject to further verification by inspection. See id at Verification Annex, S Treaty Doc
103-21 at 332-444.
Id at Verification Annex, Part III(A), S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 357-58.
"The number, intensity, duration, timing, and mode of inspections for a particular
facility shall be based on the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the
relevant chemicals." Id at Verification Annex, Part VI, 9123, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 407.
41 Id at Part VI, 1 25, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 407 (giving State Parties 180 days to
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inspection of Schedule I facilities will determine the accuracy of
annual data declarations.42 The inspection will be conducted by
inspectors of the Technical Secretariat, who must strictly abide
by the facility agreement and who must ensure that the inspec-
tion imposes the "least possible inconvenience."'
Schedule 2 facilities, like Schedule 1 facilities, are subject to
yearly on-site inspections; these inspections are also to occur in
accordance with facility agreements made between the facility
owner and the Executive Council.44 Again, Schedule 2 inspections
must impose no more than minimal intrusion. In actual practice,
an inspection of a Schedule 2 facility will be similar to the inspec-
tion of a Schedule 1 facility. However, inspection teams must
provide forty-eight hours notice before inspections.45
Inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities, which are
similar enough in practice to be considered together, will be con-
ducted on a random basis. Due to the large number of these fa-
cilities, 6 the CWC limits the number that may be searched. The
total number of inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities
combined may not exceed twenty per year, excluding challenge
inspections.47 There is no CWC requirement that facility agree-
ments be reached for these inspections." The inspection teams,
however, are limited by the scope of their inspection mandates
and by the general rule that they must minimize interference
with operations. The Technical Secretariat must serve notice to
the inspected state within 120 hours (or five days) of arrival at
the point of entry.49
The challenge inspection procedure differs substantially from
the procedure required for regular inspections. A State Party may
be subject to an unlimited number of challenge inspections per
year. Both declared and undeclared facilities are subject to chal-
conclude facility agreements).
42 Id at Verification Annex, Part VI, 1 21, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 407.
Id at Verification Annex, Part II, 9140, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 351.
Id at Verification Annex, Part VII, T 24, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 414.
Id at Verification Annex, Part VII, 1 30, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 415 (mandating
forty-eight hours notice before arriving at the site, not at the point of entry).
" There may be as many as one thousand Schedule 3 facilities and ten thousand
Other facilities in the United States alone. See Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA"),
The Chemical Weapons Convention:Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry 15 (GPO 1993).
4 CWC, Verification Annex, Part VIII, ' 16, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 420 (Schedule 3
facilities); id at Verification Annex, Part IX, 91 13, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 420 (Other facili-
ties).
Id at Verification Annex, Part VIII, 1 19, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 420 ("There shall
be no facility agreement, unless requested by the inspected State Party.").
" Id at Verification Annex, Part VIII, 1 25, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 421 (Schedule 3 fa-
cilities); id at Verification Annex, Part IX, 1 21, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 426 (Other facili-
ties).
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lenge inspections." Challenge inspections occur with minimal no-
tice. Only twelve hours notice is required before arrival at the
point of entry,5 and inspections are designed to begin within
twelve hours after arrival in the target State.52 Challenge inspec-
tions are also intrusive; the inspectors will closely monitor egress
and ingress to the inspected facility, and the inspection mandate
allows greater intrusion than during other inspections.
B. Conditions Added at Ratification
Although Article XXII of the CWC prohibits State Parties
from adding reservations to its Articles,' 4 the United States Sen-
ate ratified the CWC subject to twenty-eight conditions.55 One of
these conditions asserted a congressional right to make reserva-
tions notwithstanding Article XXII." While it is unclear how the
legal conundrum generated by these conditions will be resolved,
one particular condition merits immediate discussion.
The Senate's Condition 28 to the CWC requires that the
United States National Authority, the executive agency responsi-
ble for oversight of CWC activities, seek a warrant for any inspec-
tions, routine or challenge, conducted on American territory.57
Technically, challenge inspections are limited because a challenge inspection will
not be approved without the presentation of some evidence that tends to demonstrate rea-
sonableness. See id at Art IX, 9, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 311. However, veto of a proposed
challenge inspection requires a three-quarters majority vote of the Executive Council,
which suggests that authority for challenge inspections will be freely given. Id at Art IX,
17, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 312.
61 Id at Verification Annex, Part X, 16, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 429.
Id at Verification Annex, Part X, 1 23, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 432.
The Verification Annex contains detailed instructions regarding the perimeter to be
inspected. Unlike regular inspections, where only limited (often prearranged) areas may
be inspected, challenge inspections are required to inspect the entire perimeter, subject
only to confidentiality concerns. See id at Verification Annex, Part X, 142-52, S Treaty
Doc 103-21 at 435-37.
Id at Art XXII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 323 ("The Articles of this Convention shall
not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to res-
ervations incompatible with its object and purpose.').
' Part IIIA discusses whether Congress actually has the power to ratify a treaty con-
ditionally.
5 "[Tlhe President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has informed
all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the right, pursuant to
the Constitution of the United States, to give its advice and consent to ratification of the
Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention." Rati-
fication Resolution § 2(1), 143 Cong Rec at S 3651. See also id at § 2(17), 143 Cong Rec at
S 3656 (discussing the Senate's constitutional prerogative).
' See Ratification Resolution § 2(28), 143 Cong Rec at S 3657. See also note 11. The
bill proposed to implement the CWC exhaustively details the information that must be
provided to obtain a warrant of each type. See Chemical Weapons Convention Implemen-
tation Act of 1997 § 406(a) ("Implementation Bill"), S 610, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 17,
1997), in 143 Cong Rec S 3355, S 3358 (Apr 17, 1997) (detailing requirements for Lead
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This condition will likely be buttressed by the legislation to im-
plement the CWC that is currently pending in the Senate.5 The
implementing legislation requires National Authority involve-
ment in every inspection conducted on United States territory."9
If constitutional, the Senate's conditions will overcome the
CWC's Fourth Amendment problems. However, as will be dis-
cussed below, there is good reason to think that the Senate may
not create these conditions constitutionally.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The effectiveness of the verification regime outlined above
will determine the overall success of the CWC. This regime, how-
ever, does not require warrants or provide other procedural safe-
guards that would ensure the reasonableness of an inspection.'o
Without some assurance of reasonableness, inspections made
pursuant to the CWC may violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects United States residents6'
from unreasonable searches and seizures by their government.
But constitutional protection exists only to the extent that the
United States exercises jurisdiction. Courts have not traditionally
afforded Fourth Amendment protection to United States citizens
who are searched by agents of foreign governments, unless the
United States government has participated in the search in a
significant way.62 This Comment will focus on searches of pri-
Agency affidavit necessary for the issuance of a warrant to inspect).
" As of May 6, 1998, the Implementation Bill was under review in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
" Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997, as amended, ("Revised
Implementation Bill") § 303(bX2), S 610, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec S 5070,
5074 (May 23, 1997) (requiring National Authority to coordinate the designation of federal
employees to accompany inspectors). Mandatory inclusion of the National Authority will
likely also resolve any potential problems involving a violation of Article II, § 2 of the Con-
stitution. See Part II.A.
' The CWC does require that challenge inspections must meet the constitutional
standards of the inspected State Party. See note 4. However, because of fears that rogue
states will use the U.S.-created loophole to protect their chemical arsenals, the United
States should not rest to heavily on this pillar, lest the effectiveness of the entire CWC
topple. See Part IV.C.1.
"l Fourth Amendment protection is limited to "the people" of the United States. US
Const, Amend IV. Traditionally, this term has been applied to resident aliens as well as
citizens. 1NS v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1042 (1984) (analyzing the applicability of
the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after an arrest that violated aliens' Fourth
Amendment rights). See also Kwang Hei Chew v Colding, 344 US 590, 596 (1953) (noting
that "it is well established that" resident aliens enjoy Fifth Amendment protection).
See Lustig v United States, 338 US 74, 79 (1949) ("The decisive factor in determin-
ing" whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated "is the actuality of a share by a
federal official in the total enterprise."); Stonehill v United States, 405 F2d 738, 743 (9th
Cir 1968) ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment could apply... only if Federal agents so substan-
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vately owned facilities on American soil, which is where the
Fourth Amendment difficulties will primarily occur.'
A. Fourth Amendment Thresholds
The threshold determination for any Fourth Amendment
question is whether there is sufficient governmental action to
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. In the context of the CWC,
the question is whether a search of a privately owned facility
conducted by an OPCW inspection team constitutes sufficient
governmental action to be considered a "joint venture.' 4 If the
search does not constitute a joint venture, then it will not be con-
sidered a governmental search, and the Fourth Amendment will
not apply. While the law on joint ventures abroad is well settled,'
courts have not yet determined whether a domestic search by an
international organization can constitute a joint venture.
Most searches will clearly meet the joint venture standard of
"significant participation" when the National Authority accompa-
nies an inspection.' Then the search will be considered a joint
tially participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures between the
United States and the foreign officials.").
' A related question is whether courts will hold that searches conducted abroad by the
OPCW of facilities owned by United States citizens have enough participation by the gov-
ernment to create Fourth Amendment concerns. In these situations, courts must deter-
mine whether the United States has contributed enough aid to meet the significant par-
ticipation standard discussed in Part II-L Any situation where the United States signifi-
cantly participates-a question of fact that depends on each search's facts and circum-
stances-raises the same constitutional concerns as domestic searches of private facilities.
" Generally, searches by private citizens that do not involve an agent of the federal
government do not violate the Constitution. See Burdeau v McDowell, 256 US 465, 475
(1921) ("It is manifest that there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth
Amendment... as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the
property of another."). The test for whether a search has sufficient governmental involve-
ment to constitute a joint venture is based upon "participation" and thus is a question of
fact. Moody v United States, 163 A2d 337, 340 (DC Mun Ct App 1960), citing Lustig, 338
US at 78 ("[A] search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it.").
' In an international context, the general rule is that searches performed by a sover-
eign government in its own territory to enforce United States law are not limited by the
Fourth Amendment, but searches with United States participation are subject to the same
"significant participation" test as a joint venture occurring on United States soil would be.
United States v Hawkins, 661 F2d 436, 455-56 (5th Cir 1981) (noting that Fourth Amend-
ment protections apply to foreign government's action "if the foreign authorities were
acting as agents for their American counterparts"). But see Brulay v United States, 383
F2d 345, 348 (9th Cir 1967) (stating that the prophylactic purposes of the exclusionary
rule are inapplicable to foreign governments). This seems inapplicable in the domestic
context, since the United States is not conducting the search. For commentary noting the
unsettled nature of the law on domestic searches by nongovernment parties, see David A.
Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the
United States, 63 NYU L Rev 229, 295-96 (noting that, in situations such as an interna-
tional inspection on American territory, the law is unresolved).
'This is precisely the solution offered by pending legislation. See Revised Implemen-
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venture. Significant participation may also include government
facilitation of a search, which the United States is obligated to
provide under the CWC.' 7 Under the "significant participation"
standard for joint ventures," the government need not actually
conduct the search itself.
On the other hand, it is not immediately apparent whether
inspections that are not supervised by the United States govern-
ment meet the "significant participation" standard. However, Ar-
ticle 11, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that
the President "take Care that the Laws [of the United States] be
faithfully executed." The OPCW is not a part of the executive
branch,69 but searches carried out by the OPCW will enforce a
federal statute.70 Conferring executive authority will necessarily
add some degree of governmental involvement, raising the in-
spection to a Fourth Amendment-protected joint venture. There-
fore, any inspection conducted by an international inspection
team, with or without actual United States government involve-
ment in the inspection itself, will likely be a governmental search
and therefore will implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Even if a CWC inspection involves governmental action, it
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless the inspection
qualifies as a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
[searched] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'' Businesses, not just indi-
tation Bill § 303(bX2), 143 Cong Rec at S 5074.
, The CWC requires that inspected State Parties provide transportation, lodging, and
food to inspectors. CWC, Verification Annex, Part H, 26, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 349.
This activity clearly facilitates CWC inspections.
" See Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 223 (1960) ("[E]vidence obtained by state of-
ficers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the de-
fendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment is inadmissible."); Lustig, 338 US at 78-79 (holding that a federal agent, called in by
police after the search was performed, "had a hand in" the search and therefore the search
deserved Fourth Amendment protection); Stonehill, 405 F2d at 743 (Search conducted by
foreign officials only raises Fourth Amendment questions if accompanied by United States
participation so significant as to convert the raid into a joint venture.); Corngold v United
States, 367 F2d 1, 5 (9th Cir 1966) (Search conducted jointly by air carrier and customs of-
ficers constitutes a joint venture.).
' See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 126 (1976) (Executive officers must be appointed
pursuant to Article II, § 2.). See also Kennedy, 14 Brooklyn J Intl L at 20-24 (cited in note
14) (discussing Article II concerns).
"Specifically, the OPCW will enforce the implementation legislation, which makes
violations of the CWC criminal. See Revised Implementation Bill § 201, 143 Cong Rec at
S 5072-74.
" Katz u United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan concurring).
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viduals, may possess reasonable expectations of privacy that are
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 A search of a person who
meets these criteria will be unconstitutional unless the search
was reasonable. A warrant is the principal method of meeting
this reasonableness requirement.
B. The Warrant Requirement
The government is presumptively required to obtain a war-
rant to establish the constitutionality of a search.7' Warrants are
required for administrative and criminal searches74 of both homes
and businesses.75 The warrant requirement exists for two rea-
sons. First, the warrant requirement assures "that the deliberate,
impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between
the citizen and the police.'
Second, the warrant requirement protects citizens from op-
pressive interference and intrusions from agents of the govern-
ment.77 To ensure a reasonable right to privacy, a warrant will be
granted only on the basis of probable cause.7" To establish prob-
able cause, the government must present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the proposed search is reasonable.7" The par-
ticular contours of probable cause vary by situation.0
See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541, 543 (1967).
See Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 528-29 (1967) ("[0]ne governing princi-
ple ... has consistently been followed: except in certain carefiully defined classes of cases,
a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."). But see Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27 (1968) (holding
that a warrant is unnecessary where circumstances create reasonable belief of danger and
preclude obtaining judicial approval).
' See Camara, 387 US at 534. Although the standards for criminal and administra-
tive warrants vary, administrative warrants generally require a lesser standard of evi-
dence than do criminal warrants.
' Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 586 (1979) (homes); See, 387 US at 543 (busi-
nesses).
7' Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 481-82 (1963).
Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 53 (1967) (stating that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary in-
vasions by governmental officials").
Shadwick v City of Tampa, 407 US 345, 350 (1972).
See Camara, 387 US at 534-35 (distinguishing the level of evidence required for
criminal and administrative warrants).
Generally, the level of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment depends upon
the subjective expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 US at 361-62 (Harlan concurring). The
warrant requirements for administrative searches are less extensive than for criminal
warrants, Camara, 387 US at 534-35 (noting government interest in preventing uninten-
tional code violations), and the amount of evidence necessary to obtain a warrant may be
tailored according to the governmental interest involved. See Skinner v Railway Labor
Executives Association, 489 US 602, 619 (1989) (balancing "governmental and privacy in-
terests").
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Although warrants are generally required for a search to
qualify as reasonable, there are a few exceptions to the warrant
requirement. These exceptions apply to situations involving
emergency,8' hot pursuit,82 health risks,s searches of closely
regulated industries, and the national security exception.' The
two exceptions that pertain directly to the question of warrant-
less CWC inspections are the closely regulated industries excep-
tion and the national security exception.
C. The Closely Regulated Industry Exception
Courts have established a general exception to the warrant
requirement for administrative searches of industries subject to
close regulation." Though the justification for the exception has
shifted throughout its history,87 the exception depends upon im-
plicit acceptance of the test formulated in Katz v United States."
In Katz, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of a Fourth
Amendment search to those situations in which the individual
searched had both a subjectively and objectively reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.89 Participation in a closely regulated indus-
try subjects an individual to such pervasive and regular scrutiny
that one cannot maintain either an objective or a subjective ex-
pectation that the regulated premises will be private. Therefore,
an inspection of such premises does not constitute a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because this ex-
See United States v Rubin, 474 F2d 262, 268 (3d Cir 1973) (MThe mergency circum-
stances exception is 'established.').
See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 US 294, 298-99 (1967) (allowing
warrantless search by police in pursuit of robbery suspect).
' See Camara, 387 US at 539 (discussing health emergency situations where war-
rantless searches might be permissible).
See, for example, Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594, 600-05 (1981).
See United States v Erlichman, 546 F2d 910, 924-26 (DC Cir 1976).
Controversy concerning administrative searches arises over the constitutionality of
statutes that mandate warrantless searches in furtherance of government regulation.
United States v Biswell, 406 US 311, 311-12 (1972) (upholding statute permitting war-
rantless searches of gun dealers); Camara, 387 US at 526 (holding statute that allowed
warrantless inspections for code violations to be unconstitutional).
' Initially the justification for the exception rested on a theory of 'implied consent."
Participation in an industry with a long history of regulation implies that the individual
expects regulation as a part of the business. Colonnade Catering Corp v United States, 397
US 72, 75 (1970) (discussing historical basis for inspections in the liquor industry). How-
ever, the history of regulation has proven less important than the presence of prevalent
regulation in a particular industry as a justification for the exception. See Biswell, 406 US
at 316 (Prevalence and regularity of regulation are crucial to determining whether excep-
tion should exist.); Donovan, 452 US 594 at 600-05 (Exception recognized in light of exten-
sive regulation and an adequate procedural substitute for a warrant.).
389 US 347, 360 (1967).
Id.
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ception rests on the ground that certain specific industries are so
closely regulated that their members lack a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, however, courts have denied the exception in
situations where a statute authorizes warrantless searches that
are not tailored to a particular closely regulated industry.90
In its most recent formulation, New York v Burger,91 the Su-
preme Court limited the exception to situations where there is no
objective expectation of privacy. As a threshold requirement un-
der Burger, the industry upon which a warrantless search regime
is imposed must be closely regulated. 2 In addition, for a search to
be reasonable, the government request must meet three criteria:
the search must further a substantial government interest; the
search must be necessary to further this interest; and the regula-
tion scheme must provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant."93 Recently, courts have applied the exception to an
increasing variety of industries. 4
D. The National Security Exception
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice White raised the
possibility that national security may warrant a Fourth Amend-
ment exception.95 Under the national security exception, courts
would presume a search reasonable if the interest in national se-
curity is sufficiently strong to justify the intrusiveness of a
search. The Supreme Court has never recognized a national secu-
rity exception to the Fourth Amendment, but lower courts have
In Marshall v Barlow's, Inc, 436 US 307, 321 (1978), the Supreme Court found a
portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") unconstitutional be-
cause it allowed warrantless searches into any workplace. The Court held that statutes
not tailored to a particular industry with a history of extensive regulation are unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they allow warrantless searches. Id (holding that reasonableness
"will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute").
91 482 US 691, 700 (1987).
Id. Close regulation depends on the "pervasiveness and regularity" of regulation-
the test outlined in Donovan, 452 US at 606. See also Burger, 482 US at 701, citingDono-
van, 452 US at 600, 606.
" Burger, 482 US at 702. The "constitutionally adequate substitute" test has two re-
quirements that mimic the role of the warrant: that the individual is aware that the
search is "made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope," and that the dis-
cretion of the officers is limited. Id at 702.
4For an exposition of the various industries that have been labeled "closely regu-
lated," see John Wesley Hall, Jr, 2 Search and Seizure § 34:7-19 at 392-401 (Clark,
Boardman & Callaghan 2d ed 1993).
"'We should not require the warrant procedure... if the President... [or] the Attor-
ney General [ ] has considered the requirements of national security and authorized []
surveillance as reasonable." 389 US at 364 (White concurring).
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occasionally allowed a narrow exception that has generated con-
siderable controversy.96
Proponents of the national security exception claim that the
exception has deep historical roots." Because the Constitution
grants national security power exclusively to the executive and
legislative branches, courts have held that national security is-
sues are "political questions," which are not justiciable.'e Al-
though the national security exception and the political question
doctrine have aspects in common,99 their underlying principles
are not the same. The political question doctrine is fundamentally
a doctrine of judicial deference: The judiciary should refuse to de-
cide questions, such as those involving national security, that are
fundamentally political in nature."° The national security excep-
tion, on the other hand, can be viewed as a reasonableness excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, derived from Katz rather than
from the political question doctrine.
The national security exception is narrowly tailored. For ex-
ample, the government has invoked its national security interests
as a means to acquire foreign intelligence without a warrant. °' In
these situations, courts have permitted warrantless wiretapping
because of the need for secrecy and because of an unwillingness
to limit executive branch action. However, courts have required a
tight nexus between the person wiretapped and a foreign state.0 2
"See, for example, United States v Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F2d 908, 911 (4th Cir
1980).
"For the historical underpinnings of the national security exception, see Connolly,
Note, 24 Stan J Intl L at 211-15 (cited in note 13). National security authority has tradi-
tionally been interpreted as a part of the executive power vested in the President. See US
Const, Art II, § 1, c 1. See also Jody S. Fink, The Foreign Policy Role of the President: Ori-
gins and Limitations, 11 Hofstra L Rev 773, 790-93 (1983) (discussing the President's im-
plied powers).
"See, for example, Zweibon v Mitchell, 516 F2d 594, 623-24 (DC Cir 1975).
One court has upheld the national security exception on the grounds of the political
nature of the activity. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F2d at 914-15 (permitting warrantless
wiretap due to the compelling needs of the executive branch, noting that the executive is
constitutionally designated as the "pre-eminent authority in foreign affars"). See also
United States v Erlichman, 546 F2d 910, 928 (DC Cir 1976) (noting that in order to "fix
accountability and centralize responsibility," a national security exception to the warrant
requirement would mandate personal authorization by the President or the Attorney Gen-
eral).
'"See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208-37 (1962) (discussing justifications for the politi-
cal question doctrine). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign
Relations, in Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon, and William D. Rogers, eds, Foreign Af-
fairs and the U.S. Constitution 98 (Transnational 1990) (analyzing various arguments for
judicial deference on international questions, but concluding that courts should not ab-
stain in most cases).
"'TruongDinh Hung, 629 F2d at 914-15.
" See id at 915 (applying exception "only when the object of the search or the surveil-
lance is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators"); Zweibon, 516 F2d at 652-53 (The in-
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Indeed, in United States v United States District Court (Keith),03
the Supreme Court stated that a national security exception was
not reasonable without a nexus to a foreign state because "Fourth
Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic
security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discre-
tion of the Executive branch."4
The national security exception to the Fourth Amendment
has rarely been applied. Moreover, its boundaries are extremely
narrow. However, no court has been presented with an opportu-
nity to explore the contours of a national security exception in a
non-espionage situation, such as that presented by the CWC.
E. The Validity of CWC Inspections
When the CWC verification procedures are scrutinized under
Fourth Amendment standards, problems become apparent imme-
diately. Without an obligation to obtain a warrant, searches con-
ducted in the United States by the OPCW may be constitutionally
invalid. In order to analyze potential Fourth Amendment prob-
lems, this Part will next look at the two major types of verifica-
tion procedures-regular on-site inspections and challenge in-
spections-to determine whether and to what extent the verifica-
tion regime can avoid Fourth Amendment concerns.
1. Regular on-site inspections.
On-site inspections should avoid any Fourth Amendment
problems. The. National Authority will usually have sufficient
time to obtain a warrant after the OPCW provides notification of
an inspection. Even if the National Authority cannot (or does not
wish to) obtain a warrant in time, many of the inspected facilities
are extensively regulated, raising the possibility of a closely
regulated industry exception.
a) Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities. Facilities that produce
Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals share four major similarities.
First, there are extremely few of them within the United
States."°5 Second, these facilities produce relatively small
amounts of controlled chemicals."°G Third, the facilities are subject
dividual or organization subjected to a wiretap must be a direct agent of a foreign power to
trigger the national security exception.).
407 US 297 (1972). The Keith decision focused solely on the use of the national secu-
rity exception against domestic problems, where the individuals searched lacked any for-
eign involvement. Id at 320.
.. Id at 316-17.
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to tight regulation."0 7 Fourth, and most importantly, facilities that
produce these chemicals are required to reach facility agreements
with the OPCW that outline the scope of a potential search.l"a
Searches of facilities that produce Schedule 1 or Schedule 2
chemicals will not raise constitutional problems.' 9 Many facilities
will allow warrantless inspections to be conducted pursuant to fa-
cility agreements, which are likely to grant consent to any search
made of the premises."0 Even without such an agreement, war-
rantless searches would fit under the closely regulated industries
exception to the Fourth Amendment. The facilities in question
form a limited part of a single industry and are subject to com-
prehensive regulation under the CWC disclosure regime. These
elements suggest that Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 producing fa-
cilities constitute a closely regulated industry. Moreover, the
elements of the Burger test are met:.' the enforcement of the
CWC is a significant government interest, inspections are neces-
sary to ensure compliance, and the facility agreements form an
"adequate constitutional substitute" for a warrant.
b) Schedule 3 and Other facilities. Facilities that produce
Schedule 3 chemicals or Other identified chemicals will be subject
to inspection obligations similar to those required of Schedule 1
'"Authorization only exists for one Schedule 1 facility within each State Party. See
note 37. Presently, there are "[o]nly a few" facilities in the United States that produce
Schedule 1 chemicals and two or three hundred facilities that produce those covered by
Schedule 2. OTA, Chemical Weapons Convention at 15 (cited in note 46).
" Schedule 1 facilities are limited to producing one torme of Schedule 1 chemicals per
year. See note 37. Schedule 2 chemicals are, by definition, chemicals that are produced
only in limited quantities. The limitation of individual Schedule 2 chemicals is outlined at
CWC, Verification Annex, Part VII, 3, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 409.
'"Extensive data declarations are required for all limited chemicals. In addition,
Schedule 1 facilities are subject to continuous monitoring. Id at Verification Annex, Part
VI, 22, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 407.
'MId at Verification Annex, Part VI, 25, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 407 (Schedule 1 fa-
cilities); id at Verification Annex, Part VII, 24, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 414 (Schedule 2
facilities). Though the CWC mandates that each facility reach an agreement with the
OPCW, the pending United States implementation legislation provides that the agree-
ments cannot require that a person waive her constitutional rights. Revised Implementa-
tion Bill § 102, 143 Cong Rec at S 5071 (prohibiting waivers of constitutional rights "as a
condition for entering into a contract with the United States or as a condition for receiving
any benefit from the United States" for purposes of furthering the CWC).
" While this Part focuses on regular, on-site inspections, challenge inspections are
also unlikely to prove constitutionally suspect due to the minimal expectations of privacy
at Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities.
"'Because parties can waive their constitutional rights by contract, Zap v United
States, 328 US 624, 628 (1946), consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.
" See notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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and Schedule 2 facilities." These facilities, however, are not re-
quired to sign facility agreements. Furthermore, unlike Schedule
1 or Schedule 2 producing facilities, these facilities are large-scale
producers of chemicals; production of Schedule 3 chemicals is not
limited."' Because it is estimated that there will be at least one
thousand declared Schedule 3 facilities and ten thousand Other
facilities within the United States,"4 inspections of these facilities
will occur much more randomly and sporadically than at Sched-
ule 1 or Schedule 2 facilities.
These differences suggest that the inspections of Schedule 3
and other facilities will not meet the closely regulated industry
exception, since the "industry" regulated is tricky to define"5 and
searches will be infrequently performed."6
Realistically, though, on-site inspections of facilities that
produce Schedule 3 and Other chemicals will not raise Fourth
Amendment problems. The United States National Authority
must be notified at least 120 hours (or five days) before the pro-
posed inspection."' This requirement will provide sufficient time
for the National Authority to advise the facility that is to be in-
spected, to seek its consent, and, if consent is denied, to acquire
an administrative search warrant."
8
2. Challenge inspections.
Challenge inspections raise more serious Fourth Amendment
concerns, both theoretically and practically. First, a warrant re-
quirement will be most onerous for challenge inspections because
only twelve hours notice is required before an inspection may be-
"See Part I.AL
"' CWC, Chemical Annex, Guidelines for Schedule 3 chemicals, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at
327.
" See OTA, Chemical Weapons Convention at 15 (cited in note 46).
"'The CWC defines an Other facility as any facility that produces non-explosive hy-
drocarbons. This includes all facilities that produce organic chemicals other than petro-
leum products. CWC, Verification Annex, Part IX, 1-2, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 423. In
theory, this definition also includes facilities outside the chemical industry, such as plas-
tics producers.
"'To determine whether the inspections of Schedule 3 and Other facilities are
searches, courts must apply the Katz reasonableness formulation. It is obviously difficult
to determine whether a subjective expectation of privacy will exist in any particular situa-
tion, or, if regular inspections of these facilities occur randomly once every twenty years, it
would be objectively reasonable to be surprised when searches actually occur.
"
7 CWC, Verification Annex, Part VIII, 25, S Treaty 103-21 at 421 (Schedule 3 facili-
ties); id at Verification Annex, Part IX, 121, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 426 (Other facilities).
"'Administrative search warrants will not be difficult to obtain. The government will
probably only be required to present an affidavit stating that the CWC is in force and that
the search is being made pursuant to the Convention. Revised Implementation Bill
§ 305(b), 143 Cong Rec at S 5075.
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gin and because the inspection process must begin within twelve
hours of arrival at the point of entry."9 On the other hand, a war-
rant requirement seems particularly justified in this context,
given that challenge inspections are the most intrusive inspec-
tions authorized by the CWC. These inspections may be per-
formed on any facility without limitation to a particular industry.
The challenge inspection procedure does not guarantee that a
warrant will be obtained, so the National Authority usually will
have less than twelve hours to persuade a magistrate to issue a
search warrant.2 ° Unlike regular inspections, the National
Authority probably will have to obtain a criminal search war-
rant 1 rather than an administrative warrant. This raises serious
concerns because less evidence will likely be required to receive
permission from the Executive Council than would be required to
constitute probable cause-a requirement for a criminal search
warrant.1" In cases where a challenge inspection is not based on
sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause, courts will be
left in a quandary."
"'A loophole does exist that allows inspected states to delay an inspection of the actual
facility for up to 108 hours without violating the CWC. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X,
1 39, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 435. However, the facility perimeter must still be secured
within twelve hours of arrival, id at Verification Annex, Part X, 1 23, S Treaty Doc 103-21
at 432, and, for reciprocity reasons, the United States should not depend upon this loop-
hole.
1 It is true that in many situations warrants can be obtained quite quickly, because
the law enforcement official requesting a warrant is likely to know the judge, who will be
well-acquainted with the legal requirements of reasonableness and the procedural routine.
However, in the case of a CWC warrant request, the National Authority would have only
twelve hours to ask the inspected facility for consent, prepare the necessary evidence,
travel to the appropriate location, and prepare a brief for a judge who is probably unfa-
miliar with the challenge inspection process.
"'See Ratification Resolution § 2(28)(A)(i), 143 Cong Rec at S 3657. The need for a
criminal warrant is based upon the potential criminal liability of the noncomplying State
and upon the use of the challenge inspection as a deterrence device.
"=A request for a challenge inspection is denied only if it is proven "frivolous" or in bad
faith. CWC, Art IX, 1 17, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 312. Veto of a request for a challenge in-
spection requires rejection by three-quarters of the executive council. Id. The require-
ments necessary to prove probable cause are outlined in the implementation legislation.
Revised Implementation Bill § 305(bX4), 143 Cong Rec at S 5075.
"SUnder the CWC, the constitutionally worst-case scenario is when a State Party re-
quests a challenge inspection but lacks sufficient evidence to justify probable cause. One
solution to this problem might be to deny the warrant and inspection, subject to Part X,
1 41 of the Verification Annex. However, courts might choose to defer to the President's
foreign relations power and authorize a warrant on these grounds. This solution is dis-
cussed in Part III.C.
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In its effort to verify compliance, the scope of the CWC's
challenge inspection procedure strains the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. To avoid Fourth Amendment problems, the
search must be reasonable, as determined by the issuance of a
warrant or by meeting one of the established exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment. The challenge inspection, however, does not
fit within any previously constructed Fourth Amendment excep-
tion, and the CWC's time constraints will cause some challenge
inspections to occur without a warrant. Therefore, the procedure
must be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment, or else the
United States may fall out of compliance with the treaty."2
A. A Mandatory Warrant Requirement?
Intending to provide to its constituents maximum protection
against unreasonable searches or seizures,"2 the Senate required,
as a condition to the ratification of the CWC, that the President
certify:
that- (i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the terri-
tory of the United States ... the United States National
Authority will first obtain a criminal search warrant... (ii)
for any routine inspection of a declared facility. .. conducted
on the territory of the United States . . . [the] National
Authority first will obtain an administrative search war-
rant.126
The enactment of implementation legislation, which, as currently
formulated, requires mandatory warrants for nonconsensual
searches and gives detailed specifications for probable cause re-
quirements,27 will enforce this solution. If constitutionaljhese
provisions may reduce the strain on civil liberties caused by the
challenge inspection.
Article XXII of the CWC declares that the Articles of the
CWC are not subject to reservation. 28 Yet the Senate conditioned
1" Failure to comply with the treaty can lead to economic sanctions, negative publicity,
and, most importantly, demands for reciprocity from other States Parties, destroying the
effectiveness of the CWC. CWC, Art XII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 318 (empowering the
Conference to take action against noncomplying State Parties).
'Ratification Resolution § 2(28)(A), 143 Cong Rec at S 3657.
'Id.
" Revised Implementation Bill § 305(b), 143 Cong ec at S 5075.
" CWC, Art XXII, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 323 ("The Annexes at this Convention shall
not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purposes."). Condition 28
may be a reservation made to the Annex on Verification rather than a reservation to the
Articles themselves. The reservation would conform to the object and purpose of the con-
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ratification on its express right to make qualifications to the
treaty.'2 9 It based its authority on the Treaty Clause of the Con-
stitution: "[The President] shall have the Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 30 The ability of the
Senate to ratify a treaty subject to qualification has never been
questioned. 3' Traditionally the President has possessed the sole
authority to negotiate treaties.3 2 Here, it might seem that Con-
gress changed the treaty so much as to actually amend the treaty
and therefore encroach on executive authority. If the Senate's
power to "advise and consent" is construed narrowly, as it tradi-
tionally has been," 3 the Senate may not have been empowered to
amend the CWC, and, therefore, any reservations placed on the
CWC may be void."3
The Senate did not actually amend the CWC, however. It
ratified the CWC subject to twenty-eight "conditions." "a A "condi-
vention, which already provides exceptions to conform with constitutional requirements.
See id at Verification Annex, Part X, 1 41, S Treaty Doe 103-21 at 435. However, many of
the conditions attached by Congress attack the Articles of the CWC, which may render the
entire ratification package invalid as a violation of Article XXII, because no severability
clause was included. See, for example, Ratification Resolution § 2(1), 143 Cong Rec at S
3651 (requiring the President to certify that reservations are permitted not withstanding
Article XXII).
"Ratification Resolution, § 2(1), (17), 143 Cong Rec at S 3651, S 3656.
'US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2.
"'In fact, 195 treaties, constituting approximately 15 percent of all treaties ratified,
have been ratified subject to some qualification. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Ap-
proval of Treaties By the U.S. Senate, 19 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J 89, 91 (1996).
"This unqualified negotiating power, initially declared in United States v Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 319 (1936), has generated substantial commentary. For
contrasting opinions of the Presidenes exclusive authority, compare Louis Fisher, Con-
gressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U Pa L Rev 1511, 1512-19 (1989) (ana-
lyzing both the historical basis for presidential negotiating power and the "sole organ"
theory), and Alan C. Swan, The Constitutional Power to Terminate Treaties: Who, When,
and Why, 6 Yale Stud World Pub Ord 159, 198-99 (1979) (arguing that the rule in Curtiss-
Wright improperly limits congressional power), with Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role
in Treaty Ratification, 77 Am J Intl L 257, 276 (1983), and David J. Bederman, Revivalist
Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L Rev 953, 961 (1994) (stating that the execu-
tive is generally considered to have absolute power to negotiate treaties).
"Substantial, but not determinative, evidence suggests that the Framers of the Con-
stitution may have intended substantial congressional involvement in the treatymaking
process. See Fisher, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1512-15.
"
4 There is no case law available to determine the proper scope of Congress's authority
to place conditions on treaties that are negotiated with no allowance for reservations. The
Treaty Clause of the Constitution may alternatively be interpreted in ways that either re-
strict or empower the Senate. See note 132. While the determination of this issue will af-
fect the interpretation of the CWC, this Comment assumes that warrantless inspections
will occur despite their illegality, resulting in the same problem for tribunals.
"Congress has used four types of qualifications to alter treaties: reservations, condi-
tions, declarations, and interpretations. Reservations are the only qualification used by
Congress that actually "purports to change the legal effect of the treaty upon the United
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tion" does not change the effect of treaty obligations on the
United States."6 Traditional conditions merely create additional
requirements that the United States must meet, some of which
may conflict with the CWC. Therefore, to the extent that a con-
flict exists between the CWC and the Senate's conditions, the law
will be unsettled.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution expressly includes
treaties as part of "the supreme Law of the Land."'37 It is unclear
whether unnegotiated conditions appended to a treaty should be
"the supreme Law." If conditions added by the Senate are not
treated as equal to the text of the treaty, the National Authority
must concern itself primarily with its CWC obligations, attempt-
ing to obtain warrants whenever possible. In this scenario, chal-
lenge inspections may occur without a warrant.
If the conditions are treated as a part of the body of the rati-
fied treaty, problems may still occur. The United States National
Authority must meet both the requirements of the CWC and of
the implementation legislation. The simple solution proposed by
Congress actually creates two new constitutional problems.
First, the warrant requirement may prove counterproductive,
because the "neutral and detached magistrate" who is to make
warrant decisions may not be neutral." In a domestic context, a
magistrate may plausibly claim neutrality, because she is unin-
volved in the execution of an investigation. Because the CWC is
the law, a judge may be unwilling to breach the government's
treaty obligations because of constitutional concerns that the ju-
diciary may not be empowered to invalidate a treaty.' 9 It is pos-
sible that this magistrate will feel more comfortable granting a
warrant lacking sufficient evidence than she would breaching a
treaty to which the United States is a party.40 Thus, the neutral
deliberation promised by the warrant requirement appears Mu-
States." Bederman, 41 UCLA L Rev at 958 (cited in note 132). Declarations and interpre-
tations merely clarify legislative interpretations of treaty provisions. Id.
"Power Authority of New York v Federal Power Commission, 247 F2d 538, 541-42 (DC
Cir), vacated as moot, 355 US 64 (1957). It is unclear whether the Senate chose to declare
its twenty-eight conditions to be "conditions" with full understanding of the interpretive
meaning of this phrase.
'"US Const, Art VI, c 2.
"Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948).
See Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 996 (1979).
"This circumstance offers the most plausible explanation for the inclusion of the con-
stitutionality exception to the challenge inspection procedure, suggesting that judges will,
in fact, have the power to deny warrants. See CWC, Verification Annex, Part X, 41, S
Treaty Doc 103-21 at 435. However, the crucial factor here is not whether a judge has the
ability to issue a warrant, but whether her neutrality may be plausibly be questioned.
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sory; the warrant issued might not meet Fourth Amendment
standards, requiring alternative proof of reasonableness.
Second, parts of the implementation legislation designed to
facilitate the warrant process may be unconstitutional."' The
proposed legislation sets out the requirements necessary to prove
probable cause. This legislation may require courts to adhere to a
congressional interpretation of the Constitution, which is prob-
lematic because such interpretational power rests primarily with
the courts. 42
Both of these constitutional difficulties compromise the con-
gressional solution to the challenge inspection problem. The Sen-
ate conditions are unlikely to assuage the Fourth Amendment
concerns under any scenario, which prompts the question of
whether there is an alternative solution to the Fourth Amend-
ment problems created by the CWC. Three potential solutions
will be considered below.
B. Extending the Closely Regulated Industry Exception
One possible alternative that may alleviate the Fourth
Amendment concerns would be to extend the closely regulated
industry exception.'43 This alternative seems plausible because
the majority of challenge inspections will occur in facilities that
already produce restricted chemicals, thus possessing diminished
privacy expectations. However, this solution is unacceptable for
two reasons.
First, the challenge inspection procedure has been inter-
preted by the Senate in its Implementation Bill as a criminal
search, while courts only have applied the closely regulated in-
dustry exception to administrative searches. The doctrine was
designed to accommodate the diminished privacy needs of an ad-
ministrative search; to expand the doctrine to a context where
141 Because the Revised Implementation Bill has not been enacted, any discussion of its
constitutionality is necessarily speculative. See note 58.
"'See Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177 (1803) ("[I]f a law be in opposition to the
constitution... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is the very essence of judicial duty.'); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958)
("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."); City
ofBoerne v Flores, 117 S Ct 2157, 2164 (1997) (Congress has "the power to enforce, not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.m").
'See Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 638 (cited in note 12) (arguing that such an ex-
pansion of the exception will provide an optimal solution to the problem of routine inspec-
tions). The author admits that challenge inspections of undeclared facilities would require
a warrant, id at 632-33, which runs counter to many of the statements that the note
makes regarding the importance of reciprocity to an adequately functioning CWC. Id at
628.
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searches are designed to uncover criminal activity destroys the
intent of the exception because criminal searches warrant higher
protection.
Second, the exception has only been allowed when the
authorizing statute has been tailored to a particular, well-
regulatgd industry. By contrast, challenge inspections may be
performed in any workplace or, conceivably, in a private resi-
dence.' The closely regulated industry exception exists because
certain industries that are pervasively regulated cannot maintain
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. By expanding
the exception to cover challenge inspections, the implication is
that participation in any industry in which chemicals are used or
manufactured puts an individual on notice for potential criminal
searches for CWC violations. This implication treads perilously
close to retracting Fourth Amendment protection from busi-
nesses.
C. Judicial Deference: The Political Question Doctrine
The Constitution delegates broad powers concerning foreign
relations to the executive.' Some commentators have suggested
that, in light of the need for uniformity in foreign policy, the judi-
ciary should refrain from analyzing the constitutionality of proce-
dures required by a treaty negotiated by the executive. 46 While
the judiciary generally grants great deference to executive actions
in foreign policy matters,47 this solution will prove unacceptable
for the present circumstances.
Executive authority over foreign relations is limited by the
requirements of the Constitution.'4 The executive has no author-
ity to negotiate a treaty that infringes upon rights protected by
the Constitution. Under Reid v Covert,' where the Supreme
'"The latter possibility is slight given the definition of a chemical weapons-producing
facility, which sets the production level that proves noncompliance with the CWC at one
tonne. CWC, Art II, 1 8, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 283-84.
'"See note 132.
'"Under such a system, the judiciary would decline on jurisdictional grounds to hear
all suits brought by victims of warrantless searches. A hypothetical situation of this type
is presented in Tanzman, 13 Yale J Intl L at 38-41 (cited in note 14).
... Consider the deference given to the executive decision to wiretap for foreign intelli-
gence purposes, discussed in Part II.D.
'"The position that a treaty can never authorize something forbidden by the Constitu-
tion was first developed in De Geofroy v Riggs, 133 US 258, 267 (1890). The current for-
mulation of this belief is expressed in Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 16 (1957) ("[No agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Gov-
ernment, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.").
'354 US 1, 16-17 (1957). The judiciary is empowered to interpret treaties, because
treaties are a part of the "supreme Law of the Land," US Const Art VI, cl 2. See Kolovrat v
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Court invalidated an executive agreement on the grounds that
the executive could not use the treaty power to supersede his con-
stitutional authority, courts scrutinize the actions of the execu-
tive branch to determine that it has not exceeded its constitu-
tional limitations. To the extent that the challenge inspection
violates Fourth Amendment rights, judicial deference becomes an
abdication of a constitutionally mandated responsibility. Because
it fails to question whether executive power has outstripped its
mandate, judicial deference is too blunt a tool to use in the deli-
cate process of treaty compliance.
D. A National Security Exception
In order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the citi-
zenry while adhering to treaty obligations, the judiciary must re-
view executive actions. In particular, courts must determine
whether an inspection conducted without a warrant is independ-
ently reasonable. The interests of national security provide a ba-
sis on which to make this determination. One commentator has
recently suggested that the unmodified national security reason-
ableness test may save the constitutionality of the challenge in-
spection."5 ° She contends that the interests of national security,
as defined by the executive, "would be sufficient to support a
finding that the government's interest outweighs the individual's
privacy interests."5 ' Thus, in her opinion, the national security
exception, as currently constructed, would grant challenge in-
spections per se reasonableness.'52
Two problems, however, limit the usefulness of the national
security exception as it is currently formulated. First, existing
case law demonstrates an absolute unwillingness to apply a na-
tional security exception domestically.' If applied domestically,
the executive could invoke the national security exception in any
situation where the government feared that the activities of its
citizens posed a direct threat to the government.
Oregon, 366 US 187, 194 (1961) ("[C]ourts interpret treaties for themselves....").
"See Bing-Zaremba, Comment, 11 Temple Intl & Comp L J at 75-76 (cited in note
13).
. Id at 75.
"Bing-Zaremba does not identify any normative changes that must be made to the
national security exception in order for it to protect challenge inspections in the domestic
context, nor does she adequately explain the relationship between executive pronounce-
ments of national security and the Fourth Amendment national security test. For a dis-
cussion of civil liberties problems that may result from using the national security excep-
tion in this way, see Part IV.A
"See Part H.D.
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Second, "national security" is generally viewed as the Pan-
dora's box of totalitarianism. Once courts develop a national se-
curity exception for the Fourth Amendment, critics fear that
courts will find the exception increasingly difficult to limit, given
the large number of activities that the government may charac-
terize as involving national security."5 Unlike the other reason-
ableness exceptions, which have been developed with particular-
ity by courts, the executive has traditionally maintained the
power to determine whether something is a matter of national se-
curity. An unmodified national security exception would fail to
protect constitutional civil liberties sufficiently.
However, modifying the national security exception by in-
cluding a requirement that the national security search be rea-
sonable can produce major benefits. Developing such an exception
will create a rational justification for judicial oversight of the
treatymaking power of other branches. Previously, courts have
allowed the President to invoke national security by relying on
the political question doctrine, which, in this context, begs the
question of whether the executive decision legally can be made.
The proposed exception would allow some judicial deference while
sustaining the judiciary's ultimate power of oversight and would
give judges a way to defer temporarily to the United States's
treaty obligations while allowing the judiciary to retain the abil-
ity to make a reasonableness determination.
IV. EXPLORING THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
The United States has bound itself both to the CWC and to
Congress's own supplementary conditions. Though the National
Authority will obtain warrants whenever possible, circumstances
will arise when it will not be able to do so. Of the aforementioned
solutions, modifying the national security exception provides the
only alternative that can protect both the constitutional rights of
parties inspected and the governmental obligation to uphold the
treaty.
'"See Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 635-38 (cited in note 12) (providing a vehement
argument against broadening the national security exception); David B. Kopel and Joseph
Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation,
21 Okla City U L Rev 247, 331-33 (1996) (equating the use of warrantless national
searches with the British Star Chamber, which violated common law search rules to ter-
rorize dissident citizens); David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of
the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 Duke L J 611, 629-35 (argu-
ing that no use of the nati6nal security exception should be constitutional).
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A. Should a National Security Exception Exist?
Critics base their attacks on the national security exception
on two arguments, one ideological and one pragmatic." Some
critics are fearful of the national security exception because they
fear the destruction of rights; any exception to the warrant re-
quirement, which may label an entire class of inspections reason-
able, threatens Fourth Amendment rights. In this context, no na-
tional security interest is strong enough to overcome the constitu-
tional protection of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.'56
One critic finds the national security exception particularly dis-
turbing because the exception is extremely hard to limit.' Be-
cause the executive can determine what constitutes national se-
curity, critics believe that the judiciary will never be able to con-
trol the exception, inevitably leading to the destruction of Fourth
Amendment protection.
1. Loss of rights.
The use of a national security exception must ultimately be
justified as a balancing test."s The recent history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence supports the claim that civil rights
may be limited in the face of an overarching policy concern.'5 9 The
interests involved in national security clearly demand a similar
balancing test, under which the legitimate preservation of sover-
eignty must be weighed against the importance of individual
rights. The legislature has recently decided that civil rights are
outweighed by national security concerns in the context of alien
deportation: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 allows the United States government to deport aliens
when a suspicion of terrorist activity poses a threat to national
"
5 Gray outlines a number of practical problems with the implementation of a domestic
national security exception. See Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 634-38 (cited in note 12).
Kopel and Olson outline an ideological argument against the expansion of the exception.
See Kopel and Olson, 21 Okla City U L Rev at 329-35 (cited in note 154).
'"See, for example, Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 640-41 (cited in note 12) (noting
that inquiry into reduced privacy expectations necessarily involves case-by-case analysis
and is thus "no more than a rule of thumb'); Kopel and Olson, 21 Okla City U L Rev at
329-35 (cited in note 154).
... Gray, Note, 94 Colum L Rev at 635 (cited in note 12).
"The belief that citizens must necessarily balance civil liberties with national secu-
rity interests is best expressed in Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 255
(cited in note 1) (discussing Fourth Amendment concerns and arms control inspections).
"For example, warrantless stop and frisk searches are constitutional when made on
reasonable suspicion because such searches are necessary to enforce certain criminal stat-
utes, despite an individual's obvious expectation of privacy. See Terry, 392 US at 27 (al-
lowing search for weapons if officer reasonably believes that suspect is armed and danger-
ous); Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 66 (1968) (fleeing suspects).
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security."6 In addition, the Supreme Court found a similar bal-
ance in United States v Verdugo-Urquidez,6' holding that extra-
dition of an alien to the United States does not provide that alien
with Fourth Amendment rights. These instances illustrate that
the civil rights of individuals can be limited in the face of over-
arching policy concerns.
2. Loss of judicial control.
The argument that the executive will determine what consti-
tutes national security demonstrates the same conflation of the
political question doctrine and Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness that has plagued judicial consideration of the national secu-
rity exception. The executive clearly has the authority to label
certain issues as involving national security. When it is constitu-
tional to do so, courts should adhere to this opinion and should
decline to rule on subsequent claims.
The judiciary must remain vigilant in limiting the executive's
power to use national security in an unconstitutional manner.
The Supreme Court did just that in Keith.'62 Second, when deter-
mining whether a search is reasonable, courts should use their
own interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to determine what
level of national security interest reasonably merits an exception
from the warrant requirement.
Ultimately, the determination of whether to allow a national
security exception depends on a measurement of the interests at
stake. An interest of national security should make a search ob-
jectively reasonable if the interest is sufficiently grave and if the
magnitude and probability of injury to the individual is slight. In
the context of the CWC, this balance will often weigh in favor of
national security for two reasons. First, the destruction of chemi-
cal weapons is a true interest of national security; few would ar-
gue that the nation's interests are not best served by the univer-
sal elimination of these devices. Second, adherence to ratified
treaty obligations are a central concern to the nation. If the
United States cannot be trusted to adhere to its responsibilities,
it will lose international credibility. Thus, if a national security
exception can be developed that will minimize the risk of injury
to civil liberties, then the exception should be used.
"Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 438, 442, Pub L No 104-
132, 110 Stat 1214, codified at 8 USCA §§ l105a, 1252, 1252a, 1326 (Supp 1997).
6 494 US 259, 266 (1990).
1407 US at 320 (disallowing national security exception for purely domestic con-
cerns). In foreign intelligence cases, the nexus between foreign relations and national se-
curity is a tight one; in the CWC context, the nexus is slightly more attenuated.
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B. Can a National Security Test Be Developed?
In order for the national security exception to maintain
credibility, courts must limit the cases where "national security"
may be invoked. A national security exception should only exist if
it seems reasonable that a particular type of search should be
conducted without a warrant. To effectively protect civil liberties,
an exception must utilize both substantive limitations, to deter-
mine whether the claimed interest is really a national security
interest at all, and procedural limitations, to determine whether
the interest reasonably merits an exception from the warrant re-
quirement.
Substantively, courts must determine whether a certain type
of activity is in the interest of national security. The opinion of
the executive will, doubtless, play. a large role in this determina-
tion. In the past, courts have limited the use of national security
to cases that involve foreign relations directly," such as wiretap-
ping cases where the court required a direct nexus to a foreign
state. Courts limit the exception for two reasons. First, out of fear
that civil liberties may be compromised, courts limited the na-
tional security exception to cases where the integrity of the na-
tion was at risk." Second, courts sought to tailor the exception to
its purpose: a national security exception should be allowed only
where it was objectively clear that national security, not domestic
control, propelled the need for the exception." In a reformulated
national security exception, these goals should be upheld, because
they provide a rational limitation for national security. However,
as the CWC makes obvious, counter-intelligence is not the only
threat to national security. It is also threatened by weapons of
mass destruction and by reputational harm for failure to adhere
to treaty obligations. Thus, courts may decide to expand the scope
of the exception while retaining its essential purpose.
A class of searches may be excepted from the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement if the class meets the following
national security test. The threshold determination is whether
the search is truly performed for a national security purpose.
This determination is made by analyzing the government's inter-
est in light of the two subjective requirements of national secu-
rity: the interest must relate directly to the integrity of the na-
'"See Part I1D.
'"See, for example, Keith, 407 US at 314-15 ("As the Fourth Amendment is not abso-
lute in its terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case:
the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed
by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.").
16Id.
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tion, and the interest must be to protect the nation rather than to
suppress a dissident group. If this threshold is met, the security
interest must meet two additional requirements, based on the
Burger test for the closely regulated industry exception: (a) the
solution must be necessary for the interest to function properly,
and (b) the solution must provide an adequate constitutional sub-
stitute for a warrant." The purpose of these additional require-
ments is to limit any desire the judiciary might have to defer to
national security, broadly.
However, the next Part will analyze the challenge inspection
scenario in particular, to determine whether the procedural and
substantive limitations fulfill their duty.
C. Implementing a National Security Exception
For the national security exception to solve the constitutional
problems raised by the CWC challenge inspection, courts must
determine that, because of the objective reasonableness of the na-
tional security interests involved, a challenge inspection meets
the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment even
without a warrant. In order to meet these requirements, the
CWC must meet two criteria: it must be a true national security
interest; and its challenge inspection process must be objectively
reasonable under the modified Burger test.
1. True national security.
To prove that it raises concerns of true national interest,
courts must determine that noncompliance with the CWC will re-
sult in a threat to the integrity of the nation and that the search
serves national security, not domestic control. Because the actual
search will be conducted by foreign officials who work for an in-
ternational organization, the CWC clearly meets the second crite-
rion. Two factors weigh in favor of considering compliance with
the CWC to be in the interest of national integrity. First, the in-
tegrity of the nation depends on its ability to protect its citizens
from attack. Chemical weapons pose a true risk to national secu-
rity because of their use in terrorist acts, as well as in conven-
tional warfare. Noncompliance, or even delayed compliance,
would allow "cheating" states the opportunity to restrict United
States inspection teams from conducting inspections. Second,
noncompliance will hurt the integrity of the nation because it will
1
"While the use of the Burger test is obviously only an example of a possible proce-
dural constraint that may be applied, for simplicity's sake the test will be used as an ex-
ample in Part IV.C as well.
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weaken the bargaining position of the United States in the inter-
national community.
2. Objective reasonableness.
The challenge inspection process must also meet the proce-
dural safeguards of a national security exception, as expressed in
the modified Burger test. The inspection procedure has already
passed the first hurdle, which requires that the searches must
further a national security interest. Courts may disagree on the
second hurdle, which is whether the inspections are necessary.
Some courts may determine that warrantless challenge inspec-
tions are not necessary for compliance with the CWC, because the
warrant inspections will suffice to catch violators. However, a
more pragmatic judge would understand that the purposes of the
CWC, and of national security, cannot adequately be met by a
warrant requirement.67 The third criterion, whether the CWC's
challenge inspection procedure provides an adequate substitute
for a warrant, should pose no problem." All challenge inspec-
tions are limited by the CWC to mTinimize intrusiveness."9 In ad-
dition, participation by the National Authority should ensure
that individuals realize that an inspection has been conducted
pursuant to federal law.
Ultimately, unless courts determine that it is never neces-
sary for challenge inspections to proceed without a warrant, a na-
tional security exception to the Fourth Amendment should allow
warrantless challenge inspections to occur, while retaining judi-
cial protection of Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
In order to eliminate chemical weapons, the CWC requires a
verification method, the challenge inspection, which may violate
the Fourth Amendment. If the United States proves unable to
combat the Fourth Amendment problems through conditions
added by the Senate to the CWC at the time of ratification, courts
must develop an alternative that maintains the effectiveness of
the CWC, while retaining judicial oversight of constitutional
"'This judge would also realize that a warrant is not mandatory for a search to be
constitutional, eliminating the usefulness of the CWC constitutionality clause in this
situation.
'"For the requirements of the actual Burger test, see notes 91-95 and accompanying
text.
'"See CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 40, S Treaty Doc 103-21 at 115 ("[Tlhe in-
spection team shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility
and avoid affecting its safety ... .").
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rights. The exigencies of the situation provide an opportunity to
modify the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment,
unshackling the exception from its historic ties to the political
question doctrine, and systematizing it, so that national security
may be used to measure the reasonableness of the CWC and fu-
ture treaty verification procedures.
